The Sophistication of the Ignorant

 

Some weeks ago, over lunch, I was rather surprised to discover that one of my colleagues appears to believe that the US Government was behind the 9/11 attacks. Now, this is not some poorly educated or particularly gullible individual but a competent professional and a former political activist. And he is by no means the only such person to believe in one of the various 9/11 theories. It appears, for example, that Wikipedia's current entry on 9/11 conspiracy theories was written by someone who seems to believe some of them (although Wikipedia have added a disclaimer saying that the entry needs to be cleaned up). In any case, it is certainly not surprising that such theories are gaining ground among the less-well educated public if they have been able to make inroads even among relatively sophisticated people.

This came to mind again today while I was reading one of today's posts on Gardjola, which described a particularly hilarious example and one that is not likely to convince educated Westerners (although, to be honest, nothing would surprise me).

The reality seems to be that, whether they are sophisticated or not, many people go through life lacking adequate knowledge of certain areas that are fundamental for an understanding of public affairs. And what is true in the field of foreign relations is even more true in economics. I am no expert on the inner workings of the human mind but my guess would be that we may all suffer from some mild-paranoia which is triggered particularly by situations that are too complex for us to understand properly with the knowledge that we have available. A somewhat more reliable analysis of this fascinating phenomenon can be found in Daniel Pipes' work Conspiracy, How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From and in several articles on his website.

Incidentally, Mark Steyn has also just published a very good review of two books about 9/11 conspiracies.

At the end of the day, there is no doubt in my mind that education remains, as always, the antidote to ignorance and modern-day superstition. And the ability to provide clear and relevant bites of information in ways that can be understood by all is probably one of the contributions that moderate political blogs can make to this extremely important process.

Living in a Parallel Universe

 

Anyone interested in a short trip to a reality other than the one that we all inhabit would do well to read this letter from a Mr. Sammy Bishtawi of Pembroke, published in today's Sunday Times. In Mr. Bishtawi's world, Lebanon is a stable country and Hezbollah a charitable organization that enjoys support from all Lebanese factions, including the Christians. In 1978 and1982 Israel invaded Lebanon just for the pure enjoyment of it (there was no Hezbollah but apparently, in Mr. Bishtawi's universe, there were no PLO bases either and no artillery attacks on Northern Israel). Throughout the recent conflict 'Israel [insisted] on targeting defenceless civilians first and foremost' whereas the gallant Hezbollah apparently did not fire all that many katyushas at random civilian targets but limited its activities to fighting Israeli troops. In Mr. Bishtawi's world, the Israelis, whose true homeland is the sea, have been brutally occupying the land that the rest of the world calls 'Israel' for the past 58 years.

In the meantime, in the real world, the Associated Press has reported on the reactions of non-Shi'a communities in the South of Lebanon to the cynical use that Hezbollah has just made of them in the interests of a foreign power.

Avoiding the Mistakes of Others

 

Coming days after yet another attempt at a major terrorist attack, the statement made by the UK's Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly earlier this week, questioning the traditional British consensus on multiculturalism, comes as no surprise. Although our own situation is not identical to theirs, it may be useful for us to reflect on the successes and failures of those who have been facing a similar issue for far longer than we have. Of course, this issue deserves a far more detailed analysis than can be offered here, but I am nevertheless offering some brief notes on what I think could be the main conclusions.

As is well known, France and Britain have adopted two completely different approaches towards their large immigrant communities. France officially does not distinguish between Frenchmen on the basis of faith and ethnic background and does not even count its religious minorities. The UK, on the other hand, virtually allows them to live as separate culturally self-contained communities. Events during these past two years have shown that both approaches have very serious shortcomings, although France has probably made slightly less of a dog's dinner out of it than the British have (which isn't saying much).

Of course, the best approach would be to prevent this headache from occurring in the first place. Luxembourg, for example, has avoided the problem by recruiting its guest workers exclusively from the European continent (mainly Portugal and Italy). In order for us to do this (to the extent possible, given our location) the detention system and the policy of repatriation must be maintained and strengthened. As for those who remain, a combination of what has worked in the French and British system would probably be ideal, as long as it is combined with appropriate policies in other areas.

One thing that both France and Britain seem to have got wrong, for example, is the creation of government-sponsored ghettoes. On no account should we ever do this to ourelves in Malta. As for cultural integration, I would argue that the French policy of trying to make Frenchmen out of all comers works better than the British laissez-faire approach (French Muslims, although they are economically less integrated than their British counterparts, are nevertheless slightly better integrated culturally - in terms of decreasing birth rates and rising rates of intermarriage, for example).

Still, the UK's minorities are not only better off economically than their counterparts in France but also much better represented in the higher echelons of the corporate world (and to some extent in politics). This is for the most part due to the greater possibilities for social mobility in the UK. Needless to say, I think we should emulate the British model in this regard, not just for the sake of better integrating immigrants but also for the sake of getting our economy out of the rut it's been in for the past few years.

Moreover, in order not to exacerbate this problem by giving hope to Islamic triumphalists, we should give more priority than ever to the avoidance of a demographic collapse among the indigenous population. If necessary, we should supplement our numbers by actively encouraging part of our large diaspora to return and also by encouraging immigration from other parts of the world which share our cultural background. For this to happen, we will first need to fix our economy, which we are perfectly capable of doing if we're willing to get rid of the remaining socialist baggage and to invest in education.

With regard to our citizenship laws, we should make sure that they do not change. It is inevitable that the NGOs will move on to this target as soon a substantial community of illegal immigrants is established on the island. They must not be allowed to succeed, as it is essential that the indigenous community should retain control of the political process (while the integration of those who cannot be sent back should be sought in all other ways) and as the granting of citizenship could lead to the phenomenon of 'family reunions', which would make the problem spin out of control. Likewise, our electoral system must remain as it is, first of all in order to keep fringe movements like Alternattiva out of Parliament and secondly to prevent the setting up of Islamic parties in future.

All this might sound somewhat premature, but the best way to deal with potentially serious problems is to neutralize them as early as possible, before they even become problems. If we wait until the problem is already with us then it will probably already be too late.

Justice or Common Sense?

 

Anyone who closely follows events in the Middle East (as I have done for several years) will know that the discourse of the two sides tends to be based on issues such as 'justice', 'morality' and 'honour'. Many Israelis view the West Bank as part of their inalienable heritage and view the Palestinians as people who blow themselves up among crowds of civilians. Most Arabs view Israelis as inherently evil and confirm this view whenever the Israelis undertake military action against them (whether meant to be offensive or defensive). Western observers of the conflict also tend to see it through similar lenses: civilization vs. barbarism (for those who support Israel) or the oppressed against their oppressors (for those who identify with the Arab cause).

This approach leaves little room for compromise. How can one possibly compromise with barbarism or with oppression? The debate between the two sides is mostly limited to attempts at reinforcing one paradigm at the expense of the other. The Palestinians (and their supporters) attempt to strengthen the idea that this is really a struggle between the oppressed and their oppressors. The Israelis, on the other hand, attempt to to strengthen the perception that they are victims of a culture of death among their neighbours.

The two sides certainly believe that they have good reason to attempt to sell their own paradigm to the outside world. However, they are surely wrong in actually acting within those paradigms and promoting them within their own societies. Wrong not in a moral sense but simply because neither paradigm offers any feasible solutions. When you are dealing with oppression and injustice the only solution is their total reversal (i.e. the removal of Israel from the map). When you are dealing with barbarism, the only solution is to defeat it, as it only understands the language of force. Anyone with the slightest shred of common sense would probably know that neither of these two outcomes can ever occur. Israel will not disappear nor will the Arabs give up their claims, however many times Israel proves its military superiority.

There are essentially two feasible outcomes. A continuation of the status quo is one of them. The other is a two-state solution. However desirable the other two (maximalist) outcomes may be, they can exist only in the realm of fantasy. All the efforts in the world will not bring them about. No amount of public moaning or suicide bombings will make Israel disappear. No degree of Israeli military superiority will make the Palestinians give up.

The only question is when we will move from the present scenario to the one envisaged at Taba and Geneva. Those outsiders who wish to advance the interests of either of the two sides or of both can only aspire to do so by making this happen sooner rather than later. They can achieve this best by making the heartbreaking but necessary switch from a paradigm based on their own perceptions of justice to one based on plain unromantic common sense.

Naturalized Killers

 

Leafing through today's Times I came across this extremely interesting article by Tzvetan Todorov (made available as part of the Project Syndicate, which is a rich source of serious and challenging material). The title was, no doubt, chosen for effect and the article is nowhere near as violent in tone as it suggests. Nevertheless, it deals frankly with the West's problems in facing up to the Islamist threat.

I suggest that anyone interested in a rational analysis of this threat and the best options available in dealing with it should read this article. Some of its conclusions, such as the following, might not appeal to traditional libertarians:

Police actions must be merciless, even if this means more controls and surveillance. It is precisely to prevent the development of a collective security fear that we need to alter the equilibrium between security and freedom.

I would point out, however, that it is precisely by altering this equilibrium that our freedoms and our rights can be preserved in the long term.

Others might not like Todorov's assessment of the Bush administration's Middle East policy. I personally share many of his views on this subject too, particularly Iraq. I find the left's criticism of the war in Iraq to be mostly insane. However, the fact remains that the West cannot continue to spend its human, material and political capital in a quixotic attempt at convincing Iraqis to live together in peace. As for the spread of democracy in the Middle East, we all know what it has led to. Democracy is a very strong medicine and care should be taken not to administer it to the wrong patient.

As for our own island, we have little say over what happens in the Middle East or anywhere else. And we have no guarantees that those who do decide will get it right. But we can at least make sure that no foreign communities are established in Malta that could, in the near or distant future, threaten our liberties from within. Fortunately this requires little sophistication and even the mediocre politicians that we have and deserve could manage it if they feel sufficient pressure to do so.

Moving the Movers of History

 

With all the fighting and dead bodies on our tv screens, particularly during the past few weeks, it is easy to forget that history's most powerful forces rarely make it into the tv news bulletins or the newspaper headlines. They operate silently and over extremely long periods of time and most people are unaware of their existence. I am not referring to some conspiracy theory but merely to those demographic, economic and social changes that are usually invisible to the naked eye but whose importance in deciding the fate of nations and civilizations cannot be overestimated. To give an example, the rise of the West can be attributed to no single battle or political decision but to a powerful accumulation of human and technological resources, made possible by the continent's economic structures, which in their turn were brought into being by its particular geographical, social and cultural environment.

This, of course, is hardly an original thought. However, it is important to keep in mind that the most important occurrence in our lifetimes may turn out to be not the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11 or the Iraq War or any other such earth-shaking event. It may simply be the basic inability of our current socio-economic model to support a constant population. The BBC has been following this in a series of interesting articles, the latest of which was put online last Tuesday and concerns the particular case of Germany. It is at this stage quite clear that there must be basic structural reasons why this is happening, most of which concern the fact that in our societies women get married later than they used to and have to juggle family and career. The obvious result is that populations are beginning to fall and are predicted to do so in a much more dramatic fashion over the coming decades. Of course, this is being partly compensated for by mass immigration, which is, however, likely to have a long-term and possibly irreversible political and cultural impact on the host societies.

Right wing politicians occasionally berate Europeans for their 'selfishness' and 'lack of patriotism' and insist that we need more babies. However, expecting people to do things out of a sense of patriotism is not likely to get us very far. Our society is built around the individual and, as a libertarian, I believe that this should not change. Individuals cannot be expected to make too many sacrifices in order to achieve objectives that do not belong to them alone but to society as a whole (what economists call 'externalities'). The developed societies that have come closest to solving this structural problem (the Scandinavian countries) are those that have a social system that has transferred the economic burdens of child-birth and child-rearing as much as possible from the individuals concerned onto society as a whole. This was achieved not simply through financial contributions for every child, a la Mussolini, but also by making sure that women's careers do not suffer as a result of their helping to raise a family.

The only way in which we can have a true say in what our future will look like is by directing our policies at the real underlying forces that are quietly shaping that future. Those who want Malta to remain Maltese will contribute much more effectively to their goal by calling for a more family-friendly socio-economic system than by any other means, however important these may be.

Was it worth it?

 

With the fighting apparently over in Lebanon, at least for the time being, it is time to ask whether the Middle East is better off today than it was a month ago. Of course, it will take months if not years for the dust to settle and for a full answer to be available but, as usual, I will give my two-cents' worth on how things look right now, which is not all that different from my view on 2nd August.

First of all, is a serious conflict more likely to occur now than it was on 11th July? Assuming that the ceasefire holds until the international force is deployed, the answer would probably be 'no'. The fact that Hezbollah were in direct contact with the Israeli army on the border between the two countries was an accident waiting to happen. And it did. Whatever else the war may have achieved or failed to achieve, this state of affairs will no longer exist under the new arrangement. The fact that Lebanon has paid such a high price for Hezbollah's actions could also ensure that it will become politically more costly in future for Hezbollah to use its rocket capabalities against Israel.

Hezbollah has certainly achieved a great psychological victory. Many Arabs are now under the impression that Israel can be defeated. If Hezbollah, with the equivalent of two infantry brigades, could hold the Israelis for a month then Israel is weak and would be unable to defeat a proper army. This fallacy is not one that Arab leaders are likely to fall for. So I think that a war with Syria (the only obvious candidate) remains as unlikely as it was on 11th July. Iran is also unlikely to attack Israel directly in the short term for the simple reason that Israel is a nuclear state and could view an Iranian attack as one that threatens its existence.

Nevertheless, while war is probably somewhat less likely now than it was then, I don't see that the prospects for real peace have improved much either. Hezbollah will continue to exist and, through it, Iran and Syria will be able to veto any possibily of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. Unfortunately, peace between Israel and Syria does not appear to be on the horizon either. Peace between Israel and Iran is probably impossible as long as the Mullahs are in power.

Israel's plans for disengagement from the West Bank may have been damaged, although probably more so as a result of the Gaza experience than as a result of Lebanon. Still, I believe that it might occur anyway, simply because the alternative is more costly. I would not exclude either that a modus vivendi might be found with Hamas, although this is not particularly likely.

So, I would say that we now have a Middle East that is slightly less explosive than it was a month ago but not by much. As I've pointed out in my 2nd August post, the only strategic breakthrough I can imagine would be peace between Israel and Syria but the tragedy is that the political will is not there for this to happen.

Responsibility

 

The editorial of today's Times is a useful reminder of the obvious: that society should protect the weak and vulnerable rather than those who abuse them. The article refers specifically to paedophilia, but our society's tendency to cut the link between one's actions and the necessary consequences extends far beyond this particular example. Our courts are notorious for their ridiculously light sentencing and for occasionally granting bail even to those accused of the most brutal murders. Companies with government participation continue to exist and compete with the private sector for employees and customers even when they are losing money. People who are not fleeing persecution but simply want higher paid jobs can enter our territory illegally without any consequences and, if they are patient enough to wait for a maximum of 18 months in detention, will have their presence in Malta effectively regularized.

In recent days it has also become apparent that the culture of 'no consequences' also extends to our interpretation of events beyond our shores. The past weeks have seen countless letters and articles in our newspapers, some of them by important public personalities, all seeking to grant Lebanon immunity from any consequences for military actions launched from its territory by a private army which it allows to operate.

It might at first sight appear that sparing people the cost of their own folly is a generous and noble thing to do. Unfortunately, until we manage to change the laws of nature, evil or foolish acts will continue to have a cost. The only choice we have is between letting this cost be carried by those who commit such acts or else shifting it on to the shoulders of the innocent.

Israel's biggest dilemma

 

Today's Haaretz carries an extremely interesting article by Riad Ali, an Israeli Druze journalist, which discusses, among other things, the attitude of Israel's Arabs during the present conflict.

Most Israelis lose little sleep over what their Muslim compatriots may be thinking. They would probably be well-advised to start doing so. Israel's Arabs don't have much weight in the Knesset but they still make up over 20% of its population. If only citizens are counted (and the Arab residents of East Jerusalem are therefore excluded) they still make up approximately 16%. A quarter of the children born in Israel today are Arabs. This proportion will continue to grow as the birth rate of Israeli Muslims in particular is among the highest of all groups in the world, while that of Jews is declining. Wikipedia's article on Israeli Arabs quotes Dr. Wahid Abd Al-Magid, the editor of Al-Ahram's "Arab Strategic Report" as predicting that "...The Arabs of 1948 (i.e. Israeli Arabs) may become a majority in Israel in 2035, and they will certainly be the majority in 2048." If he is right, it would mean that the Jewish State would have existed for less than 100 years.

With such a demographic timebomb ticking, one might be forgiven for writing Israel off altogether. Yet, demographic trends are not destiny. If it starts early enough, Israel can contain the threat by making greater efforts at assimilating its Arab Israeli population (including the Bedouins, with their astronomically high birthrates) while stepping up the immigration of non-Jews (Eastern Europeans, Asians etc) into Israel and integrating them into Israeli, if not Jewish society. As a last resort, it could always grant Israeli passports to the approximately 10 million non-Israeli Jews complete with the right to vote. Yisrael Beiteinu's leader, Avigdor Liberman, has proposed the exchange of Arab Israeli areas such as Umm Al-Fahm with the West Bank settlement blocks in a deal with the Palestinians. This would reduce the number of Israel's Arab citizens by about half but most Israeli politicians reject it either on the grounds that it discriminates against the Arabs concerned or that it involves giving up part of Eretz Israel.

This demographic and political drama will play out during the lifetimes of many of us alive today. We would be well advised to observe it very closely and not to ignore its lessons as our countries too may, in the longer term, be heading towards a similar fate.

A Modest Performance

 

The government certainly does not enjoy very high popularity ratings at this moment and, unless a miracle were to happen, it looks headed for a defeat in the next general elections. I don't know to what extent this has anything to do with its actual performance, as opposed to the fact that the opposition has done what is necessary to make itself electable again. It may well be that the next general election was decided three years ago, right after the last one, when Labour finally accepted Malta's EU membership as a fact.

That said, I am not particularly impressed by this government's performance - particularly its pathetically weak stance on immigration and its half-hearted economic reforms (Fausto points out a depressing example here). By Maltese (and European) standards, its achievements have certainly not been negligible in every field. The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom shows that Malta has been steadily freeing its economy over the past eight years, moving from a score of 3.15 in 1998 to 2.16 this year (and from 75th place to 24th). Unfortunately this masks a poor performance in one crucial area - the fiscal burden - where we now actually score slightly worse than we did in 1998 (4.1 as opposed to 4). The government has clearly not treated this as a priority, and this has been reflected in mediocre GDP growth over the period (although this is due to other factors also, including the fact that our economy is having trouble making the switch from one that competes on prices - in both industry and tourism - to one that delivers high added-value). This year's pre-budget document offers little hope that there will be a serious change of direction in the fiscal field.

The greatest disappointment so far has, however, probably been with regard to illegal immigration. One of the most important, and little noticed, decisions taken by this government over the past few years has been to establish a de facto 18-month limit on detention for illegal immigrants, giving them an obvious incentive not to cooperate with the authorities in their repatriation. It is impossible to estimate exactly the price we may eventually have to pay for this (failed) attempt to appease foreign and local left-wing NGOs. Its consequences are so open-ended that it may well outweigh the government's modest achievements in other areas. Were the MLP to promise to reverse it even Pietru Caxaru might be tempted to do the unthinkable.

Mintoff's Legacy

 

As Fausto has pointed out, yesterday was former Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's 90th birthday. As the man is still alive, it may be too early to say anything definitive about his political legacy. However, I will attempt a very short and rough first draft.

What is certain is that not much of what Mintoff actually did while in power remains. He did greatly beef up the welfare state (at immense economic cost). That will remain, although not in the form that he envisaged it. His economic legacy is more dubious. He had an extremely shaky understanding of economics and this was mostly based on ideas that even his Fabian mentors were in the process of rejecting when he was implementing them in Malta. His foreign policy has likewise been rejected even by his own party. As in economics, he misread the signs of the times and created policies that could not survive in the long term. Neutrality is still there but is now little more than a legal obstacle to Malta's participation in the CFSP. The dream of Malta as a broker between East and West faded a long time ago.

Mintoff may ironically be remembered as the guardian angel of the Nationalist Party and the father of the island's present two-party system. He 'inherited' from Sir Paul Boffa a Labour Party that enjoyed the support of around 60% of the electorate, more than three times that of its closest challenger, the discredited PN. With such support the Labour Party could have governed the island for two or three decades before experiencing any serious challenge. It might even have established a Scandinavian-style situation where the centre-right is almost permanently excluded from government. Thanks mainly to Mintoff, this did not come about. Two battles with the Catholic Church and two equally bitter internal splits during Mintoff's early years meant that the party's support declined dramatically and consistently while that of its closest (but still very distant) challenger grew. By 1971, when Mintoff finally took power for an extended period, the Nationalist Party had virtually caught up with its rival, and overtook it a few years into Mintoff's turbulent premiership, enjoying a 'natural majority' for the remainder of the century and beyond. When Mintoff formally retired as Prime Minister, he appointed as his successor an unelectable politician (who was even more extremist than himself) and when the Labour Party finally returned narrowly to power in 1996, he brought this government down, ending his career as he had begun it and allowing the Nationalists to govern for another decade, during which Malta finally became a member of what he had once called 'the Europe of Cain'.

As with many other extremists before and since, his main legacy may have been to have unwittingly contributed (and in no small way) to the realization of his adversaries' long-term vision at the expense of his own. Surely this is a lesson that should not be lost on those active in the political scene today, particularly those on the two extremes of the political spectrum.

End of an era?

 

Fidel Castro may or may not survive his current illness but, either way, he will not rule Cuba forever. The time for history to judge his half-century in power will come soon. I doubt that it will be kinder to him than it will be to the twentieth century's other dictators. He reduced a prosperous (if corrupt and crime-ridden) country where the poor were very poor to one in which everyone is very poor (and which is just as corrupt). Almost all of the country's middle class now resides in Florida. Most of its dissidents reside in the country's jails.

One of the Castro regime's very few achievements has been to maintain the excellent health and education systems that it inherited from its predecessors. Over the years it has even managed to sell these to the world as its own creation. Indeed, this is a regime that has managed to maintain an amazing degree of international support, and probably a greater degree of internal support than its disastrous rule would warrant (although this is mostly because millions of its opponents have simply made their way out of the country).

What will the future look like? I doubt if the regime will fall immediately after Castro's departure. Democracy and freedom would no doubt be the best options for the country but the system is probably solid enough to resist any moves in that direction for the time being. I think the most that Cubans can hope for in the short term is normalization and possibly a more pragmatic style of government. Nevertheless, being an optimist, I would like to think that Cuba's worst years may be behind it.

A Children's Crusade

 

News from the Middle East may be bleak, but we have good reason to hope! A 'peace vigil' is being organized by left-wing NGOs and political youth groups this evening at Għar id-Dud. Second-rate poetry will be read by the (very serious-looking) poets themselves, propaganda films will be shown, kefiyyehs will be proudly worn and Israel will be roundly condemned. Everyone will feel united and morally superior to the rest of the world (that is too corrupt and too stupid to understand them).

Well, ok kids, have fun! Just try not to get stuck in that rut for too long. It looks cute when you're doing that stuff in your teens but a bit less so when you're over 30 :)

A Flawed Analysis

 

Today's Times carries an interesting article by Dr Christoph Bertram, the former director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. His basic argument is that the international force for Lebanon that is being spoken about is not an answer to the current problem unless the root cause is addressed and this, in his view, is 'Israeli unilateralism'.

Few would doubt that a bilateral approach is better than a unilateral one in establishing peaceful relations with one's neighbours. And, as I have stated before, I do believe that peace between Israel and Syria (which I consider achievable) would be a crucial strategic breakthrough for the Middle East.

However, Dr. Bertram does not explain how this bilateral approach could work with Hamas or with Hezbollah. Where there can be no bilateral approach in the short term, the next best alternative is prudent and non-belligerent unilateralism. I think that Israel's withdrawal from its 'security zone' in Lebanon and from Gaza was preferable to its continued occupation of those territories. It gave Lebanon and the Palestinians the opportunity to at least achieve some stability. Unfortunately, the moderates there did not make it (although in Lebanon they came close). However, it was a good try and Israel now is defending its own borders, which has given it at least internal legitimacy.

The same objection applies to Dr. Bertram's apparent lack of enthusiasm for an international force in South Lebanon prior to a comprehensive peace agreement. As a peace agreement is not an immediate prospect, the choice we have is not between that ideal scenario and the one that is being debated by the great powers. It is rather between open warfare on the Israeli-Lebanese border with the probable restoration of an Israeli security zone in South Lebanon on the one hand and, on the other, a more stable, if not completely satisfactory situation with the two sides being separated by international forces. It makes little sense to reject an acceptable solution just because it is less attractive than an ideal but unattainable alternative.

What future for Iraq?

 

William Patey, the outgoing British Ambassador in Iraq is reported to have painted a very dire picture of the situation in Iraq in a confidential memo to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. Amb. Patey apparently views civil war as a more likely outcome in Iraq than democracy and has said that Iraq may split up into its component parts.

My only question is 'so what?'. If Iraq is so fragile that it cannot survive without the help of a brutal dictator or a foreign army then it would probably make more sense to allow more stable and sustainable political realities to take its place. I don't think that a civil war is the best way to do this but this is up to the Iraqis really. If they want to kill each other then why should the West send its children to stand between them?

A False Analogy

 

One of the more popular arguments with those who argue that Israel's military actions in Lebanon are disproportionate is that the United Kingdom, facing a similar threat from the IRA, did not engage in any military actions at all neither against the Republic of Ireland nor against the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.

On the face of it, this argument appears to make some sense. Wasn't the IRA after all one of the most feared and best-armed terrorist groups in the world? Didn't it bomb civilian targets in Northern Ireland and in mainland Britain? Wasn't the problem finally resolved through diplomacy rather than through British military retaliation?

Even the most superficial analysis of the two situations will quickly show that this is a false analogy. Unlike Hezbollah, the IRA did not control any part of the Republic of Ireland's territory and was not therefore in a position to rain rockets on British towns. Nor was the Republic of Ireland in a state of war with the United Kingdom. Nor was the IRA committed to the destruction of the United Kingdom. Nor was the UK a country of 6 million people surrounded by actual and potential enemies.

The UK treated the IRA mostly as a domestic law and order problem because, for all its seriousness, it was mainly that. The majority of Northern Ireland's population wanted to be part of the UK, a minority did not and carried out terrorist attacks. The police, supported by troops, contained the problem until both sides were ready for an arrangement that continued to respect the principle of self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland and did not substantially alter the constitutional status of the territory.

Can Israel win?

 

There has, in the past days, been no shortage of experts telling us that it is enough for Hezbollah to stand up to Israel and survive in order for it to achieve victory. This is based on the assumption that a victory lies in the eyes of the beholder and that the relevant beholder is the Arab street. An Associated Press article published today carries a quote from retired Lebanese General Elias Hanna that sums it up: "Hezbollah wins if it doesn't lose. And Israel loses if it doesn't win".

My definition of an Israeli victory in this conflict, and I think that this is also the definition of the Israeli government, would be for the Lebanese front to go permanently quiet. Whether Hezbollah is destroyed or not is, in itself, of little interest to Israel, although it is certainly important for Lebanon’s internal balance. Of course, if they survive as a military force, Hezbollah might be able to sell the whole episode to the Arab public as a victory. At the end of the day, however, what the Arab street thinks is probably not as important as some journalists and observers seem to think. Arab leaders are not known for being particularly democratic and are for the most part fairly rational (where their own survival is concerned). None of them will rush into a guaranteed military disaster simply because the Arab street gets the false impression that Israel is weak and that it can be defeated.

The question remains, will Israel actually manage to achieve long-term quiet on the Northern Front? This blogger is of the humble opinion that it will. If Hezbollah ends up having to accept a demilitarized zone in Southern Lebanon it will lose the most important means it has of keeping the front open – cross-border raids. The rockets, which it would still be able to fire from anywhere in Lebanon, have in fact proven to be quite a flop. Two weeks of daily Katyusha barrages have led to the death of less than 20 Israeli civilians (not much more than a single suicide bombing would have achieved) and no appreciable softening of Israeli public opinion. The rest of Lebanon has paid a high-enough price for this meagre result that they will probably make it extremely difficult for Hezbollah to use its rockets to provoke further conflict in future.

Still, I would maintain that the achievement of long-term quiet in the North should be but an intermediate goal. As long as full peace is not achieved with Syria, the potential for mischief in the North and on the Palestinian front will remain. Peace between Israel and Syria would terminate Hezbollah, end the maximalist dreams of Hamas and deal a severe blow to Iran's growing power in the region. That is why I think that it is a great pity that Syrian-Israeli peace talks remain off the agenda for the foreseeable future.

More wisdom from our NGOs

 

Rudolf Ragonesi is a well-known figure in Malta's environmental NGO circles. A non-practising lawyer, he founded the GAIA Foundation and is active in Friends of the Earth. Although I do not know him personally, I have nothing but respect for his work in the environemntal field.

Unfortunately, however, Dr. Ragonesi shares with many of his colleagues in the local NGO movement a tendency to accept group dogma and to think with the heart rather than with the mind. An article he wrote in today's Times is a typical example of this suspension of the intellect. Ragonesi insists for example on repeating the usual far-left claim that Israel is an apartheid state because it does not grant the right to Palestinians (in the West Bank and Gaza) to vote in Israeli elections. Now, as everyone knows, the West Bank and Gaza are not part of Israel at all and they do have the right to vote for their own parliament and president. The whole point of the peace process is that the West Bank and Gaza should become a sovereign (Palestinian) state not that they should be given the right to elect representatives in the parliament of another country. As for Israeli Arabs, who now constitute around 20% of the Israeli population, they of course do have the right to vote in Israel.

In an ironic twist, Dr. Ragonesi then suggests that Israel should withdraw to its internationally-recognized borders and defend itself from there, 'with its vast arsenal'. Well, if I'm not living on a different planet from that of Dr. Ragonesi, that is exactly what Israel has done with regard to Lebanon. Its complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory was certified by the UN in 2000.

The only thing Dr. Ragonesi is undoubtedly right about is that Ehud Gol probably won few new friends for his country in Malta (or in Italy, for that matter). I have never really understood why a rather undiplomatic diplomat like Ehud Gol was chosen as Israel's spokesman in Italy, a country where Israel is already rather short of friends.